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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTI-TRUST LAW-INJUNCTION-RIGHT OF COURTS ' TO INFRINGE PATENT
RIGHTS.-The Federal District Court awarded an injunction against violations of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and t he Clayton Act by leading glass manufacturers,
upon a finding that the defendants through the manipulation of patents and leasing
agreements over a period of sixteen years, had achieved mastery of a large segment
of the glass industry. Having gained this position these glass manufacturers utilized
various types of restrictions in leasing the acquired patents so as to retain their
dominance in the industry. The decree of the District Court enjoined the defendants
from engaging in the distribution of glassware, or the machinery necessary for its
manufacture, in interstate commerce except upon filing of agreements with the
court whereby (1) they would license without royalty or charge anyone applying
for the use of a patent or any machine or method embodying patents presently
owned or controlled by defendants, and (2) would license at a reasonable royalty
the use of any patents hereafter owned or controlled by defendants. *On appeal,
held, two Justices dissenting, that these provisions amounted to confiscation; and
that a patent is property protected against appropriation by individuals and by
government. Decree reversed. Hartford-Empire Glass Co. v. United States, - U. S.
-, 65 Sup. Ct. 373 (1945).
The extent to which protection should be given the property right of the inventor
for the purpose of stimulating invention and fostering industrial development,
without incurring the dangers arising from monopolies, represents a problem which
arose in England in the 15th Century. At that time the crown found it necessary
to grant special privileges to individuals, corporation's, associations, towns and cities
in order to encourage and induce them to embark upon new enterprises. However,
such grants soon became the subject of great abuse. It is to be borne in mind that
at the time these patents were granted, monopolies were and had been, since the
granting of the Magna Carta in 1215, contrary td and in derogation of the common
law. The continuous encroachment of royal prerogative upon the common law,
especially during the reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King James I, gave rise to
action by Parliament whereby the Statute of Monopolies1 was passed in 1632.
However, the benefits to be derived from new inventions were recognized as being
of such general importance to the English people that it was considered advisable to
exempt their owners from the more stringent provisions of the Statute.2 The courts
have construed such a governmental grant as one which does not create a monopoly
in favor of the inventor to whom the patent runs or in favor of the patentee.
"Instead of taking anything from the public, he confers on it the greatest benefits." S
With this common law and statutory background in mind the constitutional
Congress in drawing the Constitution vested in Congress the power to provide for the
issuance of patents.4 By the Patent Act of 1790, ". . . a patent may be granted...
for any term not exceeding 14 years, the sole and exclusive rightand liberty of making,
1. 21 JAC. 1, c. 3. 7 STATUTES AT LARGE (Pickering's ed.) 255.
2. The proviso reserved from the operation of the statute, letters, patent and grants of
privilege "of the sole working or making of any new manufacture within the realm, to
the true and first inventor"; conferring upon him an exclusive privilege for the term
of 14 years.
3. Parker v. Haworth, 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10738, at 1136 (C. C. D. Ill. 1848). Cf. 4
BLAcKsToNZ, COMIENTARIES 159.
4. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
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constructing, using and vending to others. . . ."5 This and succeeding Patent Acts,
employing virtually the same language, have been interpreted by the courts as the
right of preventing others from using, selling or making-in other words a right
to sue. It is not the right to make, or use or sell the thing patented, for that the
patentee had by virtue of the common law irrespective of Statute.6 The court in
Brady v. Atlantic Works7 in 1876 boldly stated that "in the U. S. the sovereign
power of government cannot use an invention patented under the Federal Law or
authorize third parties to do so without the license and permission of the patentee
or the owner of the patent." The courts continued to hold zealously to this principle
believing that "the government of the United States, as well as the citizen, is
subject to the Constitution; and when it grants a patent the grantee is entitled to
it as a matter of right, and does not receive it, as was originally supposed to be
the case in England, as a matter of grace and favor." s Furthermore such rights of
the patentee are protected (even as against the government) "by the constitutional
guaranty which prohibits the taking of private property for public use without
compensation." 9
Prior to 1890 the main questions before the courts had dealt with what constituted
a patent and against whom it was enforceable. The passage of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act in that year followed by the Clayton Act in 1914 raised issues as to
what constituted a lawful use of the patent. It was recognized that the limited
monopolies granted patent owners did not exempt them from the prohibitions of
the Sherman Act; on the contrary there was a tendency to place a strict construction
upon the privilege granted and to confine it to the invention as described in the
patent claim,' 0 in the belief that the courts must apply the statute as written and
not avoid a true construction because it proved to be a hard one.'1 This construc-
tion was modified later in Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States wherein Chief
Justice White stated that the Anti-trust Act contemplated and required a standard
of interpretation and it was intended that the standard of reason, which had been
applied at common law at the time of the passage, determine whether acts were
within its prohibitions.' 2 This "rule of reason" has continued to be applied and
the necessity for it is recognized even by modern critics of the patent system.' 3
The years of economic depression have fostered a critical attitude toward our
whole economic system. As one of the factors in that system our patent policy
could not escape review. Two of the outstanding critics who arose to oppose the
existing patent system were Thurman W. Arnold14 and Professor Walton Hamilton.Y5
5. 1 STAT. 109 (1790).
6. Hartman v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 145 F. 358, 363 (E. D. Ky. 1906).
7. 3 Fed. Cas. 1190, 'No. 1794 (C. C. D. Mass. 1876).
S. James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356, 358 (1881).
9. Hollister v. Benedict, 113 U. S. 59, 67 (1885). For an interesting argument that the
United States has no right to exclude anyone from making, using or vending an inven-
tion disclosed by a patent, formerly owned by a national of an enemy country, see Wille,
Government Ownership of Patents (1943) 12 FoRDuAm L. REv. 105.
10. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405 (1908).
11. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 (1908).
12. 221 U. S. 1 (1910).
13. ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECK OF Busmiss (1940) 67.
14. Former Asst. Atty.-Gen. in charge of Anti-Trust Division, Dept. of Justice. Author
of THE BOTTLENECKS OF BusinEss (1940).
15. Professor of Law, Yale University.
[Vol. 14
RECENT DECISIONS
Arnold in 1940 became Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Anti-Trust
Division of the Department of Justice and was thereby in a position to put his
theories into operation. He did not oppose the application of the "rule of reason"
but on the contrary has recognized that under our present highly integrated indus-
trial system there will necessarily be many business activities which are technically
restraints of trade or competition.' 6 He likewise recognized that many of these
restraints actually result in public benefit.17 Arnold's test where the question of the
legality of a patent under the Sherman Act arises is whether the patentee is so using it
as to disrupt, interrupt or bottle up the free flow of trade in interstate commerce.
While he was Assistant Attorney General the government secured an injunction
against Ethyl Gas Corporation.' 8 The Supreme Court found that the use by the
corporation of a jobbers' licensing system in building up a combination capable of
use and actually used as a means of controlling jobbers' prices and controlling com-
petition among them, for which it could not lawfully contract, extended beyond its
patent monopoly and was a violation of the Sherman Act.19 This decision was re-
garded by Mr. Arnold as revolutionary. 20 It is submitted that the decision is in
accord with American Lecithins Co. v. Warfield Co.21 and the use of patent rights
as employed by the defendants would certainly fall within the class of rights not
protected under the statute as set forth in United States v. Motion, Picture Patents
Co. 22 One cannot take issue with the court in United States v. Univis Lens Co. 23 in
holding that the patentee's "monopoly remains so long as he retains the ownership
of the patented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article" and
the patentee may not thereafter control the resale price of patented articles which
he has sold, by stipulating for price maintenance by the vendees. It would appear
that little has actually occurred in recent years in the way of startling new inter-
pretations of the scope of the patentee's right of using his patent. The decision in
Hartford-Empire was therefore to be expected from the findings.
It was the contention of counsel for the government that forfeiture provisions
in the decree of the district court are justified by recent decisions. Injunctive relief
has customarily been granted where defendant has been found to have violated the
Sherman or Clayton Acts. If the defendant suffered as a result it was purely inci-
dental. However, in the cases of B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis24 and Morton Salt Co.
v. Suppiger Co. 2 5 the plaintiff patentees brought actions to secure injunction against
infringements of their patents. Upon proof that patentees were using their katents
to establish limited monopolies, the court held the maintenance of a suit by plaintiffs
for infringement was contrary to public policy. It cannot be denied that this works
a forfeiture of the defendant's right.26 However, in accordance with the equitable
16. See note 13, supra; also Book Review (1941) 3 LA. L. REV. 841. Cf. HAMTOiN,
THE PATTERN oF CoMPETIT ON (1940) 97-98.
17. See note 13 supra.
18. Ethyl Gas. Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436 (1940).
19. Id. at 458.
20. ARNoLD, op. cit. supra note 13 at 30. -
21. 105 F. (2d) 207, 211 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
22. 225 Fed. 800, 810 (E. D. Pa. 1915), aff'd without op. 247 U. S. 524.
23. 316 U. S. 241, 250 (1942). See Bloomer v. McQuewen, 14 How. 539 (1860).
24. 314 U. S. 495 (1942).
25. 314 U. S. 488 (1942).
26. See note 6, supra. See also, Arnold, The Abuse of Patents (1942) 24 Journal of
Patent Office Soc. 531, 543.
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principle that one seeking relief must come with clean hands, it appears justifiable.
The following year the court, having denied a plaintiff a right of action, by subse-
quent interlocutory decree granted an injunction against future infringement and
an accounting on proof that plaintiff had purged itself of its illegal conduct and
dismissed defendants' counterclaim wherein it sought to restrain plaintiff from
enforcement of the provisions of its licenses,2 7 thus restoring to 'plaintiff his full
rights upon proof of good conduct. In the Hartford-Empire case the government
claimed the right to permanently restrict the plaintiff in the use of his rights, by
denying him any choice as to future leases or any control over the price of a lease.
For the government to require that any party requesting a license must be allowed
one and at a price determined to be reasonable by the court,28 is in accord with Pro-
fessor Hamilton's proposal that a system of compulsory licenses be enacted.2 9 This
is the system in force under the Nazi Patent Law30 and is more in harmony with
the philosophy of Totalitarianism than of Democracy. 3' Professor Hamilton says:
"The Constitution seeks 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts'; a
statute, seeking to implement, grants to the inventor an exclusive right . . . The
inventor assigns his right to a corporation; the corporation erects a monopoly . . .
and uses its letters patent as armament against legal attack. . . . A patent thus
becomes a shield which protects the industry from the oversight of the Govern-
ment."'8 2 He construes the rights attaching as a result of the granting of a patent
as in the nature of a lease, a privilege from the government in derogation of the
public domain. He overlooks the fact that a patent is granted for something which
did not previously exist but which by disclosure adds to the public domain. What
owner of property does as much for the common good? "Does the owner of land,
or a house, or an automobile, hold his property for only 17 years, and then turn it
over to the public for the latter's free use?"3 3 Under Hamilton's proposal the
owner of a patent would not even within the 17 years enjoy its full benefits. Could
there be any incentive to the inventor under such a system? Why should an inventor
or corporation bother to spend millions in research or development?
The Temporary National Economic Committee recommended to Congress that
the courts be given power to cancel a patent which had been used as an instrument
to violate the anti-trust laws. However, its recommendations were not adopted. 34
The Supreme Court has rightly refused to enter upon such a policy. In reaffirming
27. Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp., 132 F. (2d) 947, 959 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943).
28. - U. S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 373, 387 (1945).
29. Final Report & Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee,
Sen. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 36-37. See also Hamilton, Patents and
Free Enterprise, MONOGRAPH No. 31, Temporary National Economic Committee (1941).
30. Book Review (1942) 56 HARV. L. REV. 498, 500.
31. Congress was asked as early as 1877 and frequently since to adopt a system of
compulsory licensing of patents as shown in H. R. 8776, 62d Cong. 1st Sess. (1911); Sen.
Rep. No. 2303, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. (1942); H. R. 1371, 78th Cong. (1943).
32. HAmILTON, THE PA"R.w or COMPETrION (1940) 72-73. See also Hamilton, Patents
and Free Enterprise, MONOGRAPH No. 31, Temporary National Economic Committee (1941)
145.
33. Book Review (1942) 56 HARv. L. REN. 498, 500.
34. See note 29 supra.
But one of President Truman's first official acts was a directive to Secretary of Commerce
Wallace to investigate any misuse of patents to support unlawful monopolies in contraven-
tion of the purpose of anti-trust laws. N. Y. Times, April 27, 1945, p. 17, col. 5.
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the fundamental right of property in the inventor at this critical juncture, strength
and stability are added to the patent system which has played such a large part
in raising the American standard of living.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-EFFECT OF PROVOCATION ON LIABILITY AND DAMAGES.-
Plaintiff sued defendant for damages resulting from an assault and battery. Defen-
dant and plaintiff's brother had a quarrel and blows were struck. Shortly thereafter,
the defendant entered his car and started to leave the scene of the altercation.
As the defendant was driving his car away, the plaintiff called to the defendant not
to go but to stay and discuss the trouble. There was some controversy as to what
happened next, the plaintiff claiming that the defendant attempted to run over him
and the defendant denying it. It was admitted by both parties, however, that the
plaintiff struck at the defendant while the latter was seated in the passing car
and that the defendant stopped his car a short distance away and shot and wounded
the plaintiff. The trial court found for the defendant after coming to the conclu-
sion that the facts showed the plaintiff was the aggressor. Ponthien v. Coco, 18 So.
(2d) 351 (La. App. 1944).
The decision in this case reaffirms the accepted doctrine in Louisiana that a person
who provokes an assault cannot recover damages resulting therefrom.1 It has long
been held in that jurisdiction, that threatening acts by the plaintiff constitute provo-
cation which will prevent him from recovering damages for a resulting assault. Thus,
the plaintiff has been denied recovery where he was the first to shoot2 or strike3
the defendant. The defense is based not on the justification of self-defense, but on a
legal disability resting upon the plaintiff as a consequence of his own fault.4 The
Louisiana rule is often stated to be that one who is himself at fault cannot recover
for a wrong resulting from such fault. 5 In Finkelstein v. Naihaus,6 which has been
generally followed in Louisiana,7 the court held that included within such fault are
insults, abuse, threats, or other conduct well calculated to arouse either resentment
or fear.
The Louisiana law in this respect is clearly opposed to the majority rule in the
United States and at variance with the common law which holds that provocation,
in and of itself, never justifies an assault. The majority view permits a party -the
1. (1944) 5 LA. L. REV. 617.
2. Johns v. Brinker, 30 La. Ann. 241 (1878).
3. Vernon v. Bankston, 28 La. Ann. 710 (1876).
4. Fontenelle v. Waguespack, 150 La. 315, 90 So. 662 (1922); Vernon v. Bankston,
28 La. Ann. 710 (1876); Herrington v. Magee, 15 La. App. 183, 131 So. 490 (1930).
5. Oakes v. H. Well Baking Co., 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932) ; Fontenelle v. Wague-
spack, 150 La. 315, 90 So. 662 (1922); Graham v. McCrory, 8 La. App. 22 (1928).
6. 151 So. 686 (La. App. i933). When plaintiff tried to persuade some customers of
tie defendant to buy in her store, the defendant told plaintiff to "shut up." Plaintiff
thereupon swore at defendant and a fight resulted. Held; plaintiff was barred from recovery.
7. Walsh v. Schriner, 168 So. 345 (La. App. 1936). Where defendant struck the plain-
tiff with a flashlight after plaintiff had cursed at his wife, the court allowed no recovery
for the plaintiff as he was the aggressor and further held that aggression could be shown
by threats, insults, or abuses as well as by blows and hostile attitudes. Jumonville v.
Frey's, Inc., 173 So. 227 (La. App. 1937); Landry v. Himel, 176 So. 627 (La. App.
1937).
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privilege of resorting to the use of force without liability only when he is threatened
with actual bodily harm or reasonably believes himself to be so threatened.8 He is
privileged to use only such force as is essential to protect his person and no more.9
Words alone never justify an assault.'0 The privilege which allows a man to protect
himself in an emergency is based on necessity. It is clear that the Louisiana doctrine
is not an extension of the common law rule but is based upon the entirely different
theory that a plaintiff disables himself from recovery for an assault, if he brings on
the assault through his own fault.
It is nevertheless interesting to note that in a few recent Louisiana cases the com-
mon law rule appears to have been followed. There is a decision in the case of
Randall v. Ridgley" and language in the cases of Oakes v. H. Weil Baking Co.12
and Newman v. Southern Kraft Corporatio,03 to the effect that mere fault is not
enough to disqualify a plaintiff where the defendant used greater force than was
required by the circumstances. This decision and dicta do not appear to represent
the majority view in Louisiana and were rejected by the court in the instant case.
In most jurisdictions, however, provocation does have this importance: it is well
settled doctrine in jurisdictions which recognize punitive damages that acts and
words of provocation, while never a complete defense to actions of assault and
battery, may be considered in mitigation of punitive damages. 14 If provocation is
present, the allegation of a deliberate or malicious wrong, upon which the award
of punitive damage is based, may be entirely disproved or explained.15
8. See, RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 63; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 125-127.
9. Cockcroft v. Smith, 11 Mod. 43, 1 Ld. Ray. 177, 2 Salk. 641 (K. B. 1705); Dale v.
Wood, 7 Moore 33 (Com. P1. 1822); Higgins v. Minaghan, 78 Wis. 602, 47 N. W. 941
(1891); Murphy v. Coleman, 9 Ala. App. 625, 64 So. 185 (1913).
10. Hixson v. Slocum, 156 Ky. 487, 161 S. W. 522 (1913); Royal Oak Stave Co. v.
Groce, 113 S. W. (2d) 315 (Texas Civ. App. 1938).
11. 185 So. 632 (La. App. 1939). After the plaintiff was ejected from a barroom for
causing a disturbance, he remained outside the establishment and continued to be dis-
agreeable by cursing and reviling the defendant, the proprietor, whereupon the proprietor
shot him. The court said that although plaintiff annoyed the defendant with opprobrious
epithets, no blows were struck and it does not appear that the defendant was in danger
of bodily harm. It was held that the plaintiff might recover as use of firearms in this
situation was unwarranted.
12. 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932). Plaintiff, employee of the defendant, was dis-
charged by the defendant, ejected from the premises and given a parting kick. Court held
that the plaintiff was not at fault but said that even if the plaintiff were at fault, under
no theory could it be said that the defendant was warranted in using any greater force
than was necessary under the circumstances.
13. 197 So. 197 (La. App. 940). Plaintiff, who was on the defendant's property seek-
ing employment, was hit with a blackjack by the defendant's watchman. The court said
that plaintiff was not the aggressor, but that even if he were a trespasser, the force used
was excessive.
14. Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N. Y. 440 (1876); Robison v. Rupert, 23 Pa. St. 523
(1854) ; Schmitt v. Kurrus, 234 Ill. 578, 85 N. E. 261 (1908) ; Goldsmith's Adm'r. v. Joy,
61 Vt. 488, 17 Atl. 1010 (1889) ; Thomas v. Williams, 139 Wis. 467, 121 N. W. 148 (1909).
15. Tatnell v. Courtney, 6 Houst. (Del.) 434 (1881). If the character of the assault
is disproportionate to the amount of provocation, the plaintiff may still be liable in puni-
tive damages, the provocation being significant on the amount thereof. Donnelly v. Harris,
41 Ill. 126 (1866).
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While nearly all jurisdictions permit provocation to be considered in mitigation
of punitive damages there is a disagreement as to whether or.not provocation may
mitigate compensatory damages. The majority view holds that provocation is not
admissible to disprove actual damages, 16 while a strong minority allows the mitiga-
tion of actual damages under such circumstances. 17 The Pennsylvania case of Robi-
son v. Rupert's is the leading decision which announces the minority rule. In the
Robison case, the defendant shot at the plaintiff and some other boys who had
annoyed him. The court held that such provocation prevented the plaintiff from
recovering exemplary damages and the acts of provocation were admissible to miti-
gate compensatory damages. The leading New York decision, Kiff v. Youmans'0
is in accord with the minority. In that case the defendant removed a trespasser from
his property by force and the court said that the fact that the assault was provoked
by the trespasser's refusal to leave the defendant's premises should be taken into
consideration in estimating the actual damages. 20 The New York court defended its
position by declaring that the rule is correlative to that which permits circumstances,
such as time and place of an assault or insulting words or other circumstances
heightening the* plaintiff's indignity to aggravate the actual damages.2 1 To better
understand this reasoning it is helpful to recall to mind that damages resulting from
assault include not only compensation for the actual physical injury suffered by
the plaintiff, but also compensation for the less tangible damage consisting of men-
tal anguish and humiliation.2 2 A sound distinction is stated by the Wisconsin Court
in Ulrich v. Schwarz2- which gives to the evidence of provocation its proper proba-
tive effect. In that case, the court indicated that provocation could not be shown
in mitigation of compensatory damages other than injured feelings, mental anguish
and humiliation, but might be considered as tending to disprove the latter.
16. Housmanv. Peterson, 76 Or. 556, 149 P. 538 (1915); Cooper v. Demby, 122 Ark.
266, 183 S. W. 185 (1916); Goldsmith's Adm'r v. Joy,. 61 Vt. 488, 17 Atl. 1010 (1889);
Metzinger v. Perry et al, 197 Wis. 16, 221 N. W. 418 (1928) ; Royer v. Belcher, 100 W.
Va. 694, 131 S. E. 556 (1926).
17. Jackson v. Old Colony St. R. Co., 206 Mass. 477, 92 N. E. 725 (1910); Robison
v; Rupert, 23 Pa. St. 523 (1854); Bascom v. Hoffman, 199 Iowa 941, 203 N. W. 273 (1925).
18. 23 Pa. St. 523 (1854).
19. 86 N. Y. 324 (1881).
20. Kiff v. Youmans, supra note 19 was followed in Genung v. Baldwin, 77 App. Div.
584, 79 N. Y. Supp. 569 (3rd. Dep't 1902). Here, the defendant was angered when the
plaintiff criticized him in his newspaper. The next day the defendant assaulted the plain-
tiff. The court held that if the defendant were provoked by the newspaper article, the
lower court erred in not permitting the jury to take into account the mitigating circum-
stances for the purpose of reducing the actual as well as the punitive damages. In Freed-
man v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 89 App. Div. 486, 85 N. Y. Supp. 986 (2d Dep't. 1903),
where an action was brought against a street railway company for an assault committed
by one of its conductors on a passenger, it was held error to charge that, even -f the
jury found that the conduct of the plaintiff was such as to aggravate the conductor
into making the assault, such conduct could not be taken into consideration in fixing the
amount of the plaintiff's compensatory damages, but only in mitigation of exemplary or
punitive damages.
21. Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N. Y. 324 (1881).
22. McConancK, DAMAGES (1935) 316-317.
23. 199 Wis. 24, 225 N. W. 195 (1929).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The Louisiana rule, however, seems clearly unsound. It gives to a man no remedy
for bodily harm inflicted upon him if he were at fault in the first instance. It pre-
cludes the aggressor from recovery even though the assault is out of all proportion
to the provocation. But does not the assailant when he uses excessive force subse-
quently become the aggressor? Should the law not compel him to make compensation
for his wrongful act? The Louisiana rule, so far at least as it provides immunity
from civil liability; seems not only unsound but dangerous. To this extent it per-
mits the citizen to take the law into his own hands. It is not inconceivable that
many a man who could otherwise control his temper, might deliberately resort
to the use of force and take the chance of not being punished in a criminal prose-
cution. In defense of the Louisiana position it has been said that a person must
come into court with clean hands and if both parties are at fault, neither of the
two wrongdoers may recover.2 4 The "clean hands" doctrine is one which equity
courts may invoke at their discretion. There is no such comparable rule at law.
Nor should there be. There are few controversies in our court dealing with the
conduct of people in which either party is completely without fault and if this rule
of equity were practiced in our courts of law, the administration of justice would
be severely hampered.
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE-VALIDITY OF COMMON LAW-v MARRIAGE ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN CITIZENS OF NEW YORK IN COMMON LAW JURIsDIcTION.-Plaintiff and
the deceased, at all relevant times residents of New York, lived together as man
and wife from sometime in 1935 up to the time of decedent's death in 1940. At
frequent intervals during this five year period, the two visited jurisdictions where
common law marriages were recognized as valid; and while in such jurisdictions,
satisfied the requirements obtaining there for the creation of a valid common law
marriage. This is an action against the executors of the will of the deceased for a
judgment declaring the plaintiff, the wife and now widow of the deceased. The trial
court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal to the Appellate Divi-
sion, held, judgment reversed.1 Shea v. Shea, - App. Div. -, 52 N. Y. S. (2d)
756 (2d Dep't 1945).
The fundamental prerequisites of the common law form of marriage were suc-
cinctly set forth when one of our leading jurists said, "No peculiar ceremonies are
requisite by the common law to the valid celebration of the marriage. The consent
of the parties is all that is required . . . .consent freely given by parties competent
to contract."2 And this was the law of England from as early as 12 54a up to the
time of the passage of the Marriage Act of 1753 making informal marriages by
consent illegal.4 From the earliest days of our American jurisprudence, informal
24. (1944) 5 LA. L. REv. 617, 620.
1. Although all of the Justices of the Appellate Division agreed that the judgment
should be reversed, only two of them (a minority) thought the judgment should be re-
versed on the ground that the alleged common law marriage would not be valid in New
York. One held that no common law marriage had been established by the evidence, and
agreed with two, who voted for reversal on an error of evidence, that if the common law
marriage had been valid where contracted, it should be held valid in New York.
2. 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (14th ed., 1896) 87.
3. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed., 1923) 379, 380.
4. 1 VERNMR, AMERmcAx FAMLY LAWS (1931) 102.
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marriages based upon mutual consent, without ceremony or officiant, have been
considered valid as common law marriages by a majority of the states.5 This was
the status of the laws in New York State following the revolution of 1688 in Eng-
land,0 as was expressly pointed out by Chancellor Kent when he said, "We are
placed in a, singular situation in this state and probably one unexampled in the
Christian world, since we have no statute regulating marriage or prescribing the
solemnities of it, or defining the forbidden degrees' 7
The first statute regulatory of marriage solemnizaton was placed, upon the statute
books of our state to take effect as of January 1, 1830.8 In April of that same
year the statute was amended to state expressly that it was not the intent of the
revisers to outlaw the common law form of marfiage,9 so that from that time on,
common law marriages were still recognized as valid in New York. In 1901, Section
19 was added to the New York Domestic Relations Law' 0 providing that marriages
contracted subsequent to its effective date would not be valid unless they were
performed in compliance With the provisions of the statute. This statute, as it then
stood, was held by the courts to invalidate the common law marriage in New
York.11 That provision, however, was repealed in 190712 and it was thereafter held
by the New York Court of Appeals that common law marriagds contracted within
the state subsequent to this repeal would be valid13 even though the subdivision
of the statute describing the forms of solemnization required 14 was allowed to
remain.15
The most forceful argument advanced in favor of the recognition of common law
marriages would appear to be the prevention of illegitimacy.' 6 Unfortunately, how-
ever, the common law marriage status was often alleged in an effort to establish
fraudulent claims against decedents' estates.' 7 Having this abuse of the law in
mind, the Commission to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates in 1933 advo-
cated the abolition of common law marriages.' 8 Acting largely upon this recom-
5. Ibid.
6. 3 HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATaIMONI A INSTITUTIONS (1904) 171-174, 185.
7. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 John's Ch. 343, 347 (N. Y. 1820).
8. 2 Rev. Stat. (1st ed. 1827-1828) at 139.
9. 3 Rev. Stat. (1st ed. 1827-1828), at 152 App., this sentence was added: "Nor shall
the provisions of this Article be construed to require the parties to any marriage, or any
minister or magistrate to solemnize the same in the manner herein prescribed; but all
lawful marriages contracted in the manner heretofore in use in this state, shall be as valid
as if this Article had not been passed."
10. N. Y. Laws 1901, c. 339, §§ 2, 3.
11. Pettit v. Plettit, 105 App. Div. 312, 93 N. Y. Supp. 1001 (3d Dep't 1905).
12. N. Y. Laws 1907, c. 742, repealing N. Y. Laws 1901, c. 339.
13. Matter of Hinman, 206 N. Y. 653, 99 N. E. 1108 (1912), aff'g 147 App. Div. 452,
131 N. Y. Supp. 861 (3d Dep't 1911).
14. N. Y. Laws 1901, c. 339, § 2.
15. Ziegler v. Cassidy's Sons, 220 N. Y. 98; 115" N. E. 471 (1917).
16. See Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N. *Y. 422, 169 N. E. 632 (1930). Meister v. Moore, 96
U. S. 76, 81 (1877).
17. Matter of Pratt, 233 App. Div. 200, 251 N. Y. Supp. 424 (4th Dep't 1931);
Matter of Brush, 25 App. Div. 610, 49 N. Y. Supp. 803 (1st Dep't 1898).
18. See statement by Senator George R. Fearon in the New York State Bar Association
Bulletin of 1933, p. 635 (June). "The purpose of the amendment is to abolish common
law marriages contracted after the bill becomes law."
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mendation, 19 a bill to that end was presented to the legislature and adopted. 20 The
opening paragraph of the amended statute which still stands as the law of this
state reads, "No marriage shall be valid unless solemnized by either: . . ." there
then follows the various methods and modes of solemnization. 21
Two of the justices in the instant case interpreted this new amendment as having
so radically changed the wording of the statute that the meaning given to the similar
amendment of 190122 would be no longer applicable; but rather, that a correct
interpretation of the present statute must be that its provisions are mandatory
when applied to New York citizens, rather than "directory" or "regulatory. '23 While
the statute therefore abolished common law marriages contracted within the state
subsequent to its effective date,24"if the relationship existed at the time of its-enact-
ment, it remained unaffected. 25
It has been the general rule in this country that those jurisdictions which them-
selves do not sanction the common law form of marriage, will, however, recognize
the status of individuals entering into such marriages within jurisdictions sanction-
ing them26 and this was the rule applied in New York prior to 1933,27 even though
the parties thereto were citizens of New York and had gone to the foreign juris-
diction for that specific purpose,28 and, notwithstanding the fact that the Laws of
1901, invalidating common law marriages in New York, were then in force. 29 This
rule is fundamental in the law of Conflict of Laws30 and in its general application
does not differentiate between situations where the parties enter into the marriage
contract while transients in the recognizing jurisdiction and situations where the
parties are actually domiciled there.3 '
Two of the justices in the instant case were of the opinion that common law
marriages contracted in foreign jurisdictions by residents of New York are no
longer recognized as valid in this state. It is doubtful whether this minority
opinion is correct. The inference they draw, that the New York legislature, at the
time of passing this amendment, intended to affect the status of such individuals
is questionable, the long standing rule being to the opposite effect. The doctrine is
firmly established in our law that an intention of making an innovation in a long
established rule of law is not to be imputed to the legislature in the absence of a
19. See Andrews v. Andrews, 166 Misc. 297, 1 N. Y. Supp. 760, 763 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
20. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 606, amending N. Y. DomrzsTc RELATIONs LAW, § 11.
21. Ibid.
22. The earlier statute, N. Y. Laws 1901, c: 339, was held to be regulatory and directory
rather than mandatory. Zeigler v. Cassidy's Sons, 220 N. Y. 98, 103, 115 N. E. 471, 473
(1917).
23. - App. Div. -, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 756, 759 (2d Dep't 1945), "Because of the
difference in the wording of the present statute it would seem to be a fair inference that
the Legislature intended to affect the validity of a marriage not solemnized as provided by
the present statute."
24. Spenser v. Spenser, - Misc. -, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 887 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1943).
25. Cavanaugh v. Valentine, - Misc. -, 41 N. Y S. (2d) 896 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
26. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT or LAws (1934) § 123; Petras v. Petras, 7 Boyce 290, 105
AtI. 835 (Del. 1919).
27. Matter of Burke, 143 Misc. 268, 256 N. Y. Supp. 862 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
28. Matter of Seymour, 113 Misc. 421, 185 N. Y. Supp. 373, 381 (Surr. Ct. 1920).
29. Ibid.
30. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) § 123.1.
31. 1 BisHop, MARRIAGE, DivoRCE AND SEPARATION (1891) § 838, "Marriage being a
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clear manifestation of such intention.32 In order for the minority to justify their
view, it must be shown that the legislature intended to raise a strong prohibition
against recognizing such a status. The vaccilating history of New York regarding
recognition and non-recognition of common law marriage proves convincingly that
such public policy is not satisfactorily shown by them in their interpretation of
the minor verbal changes in the New York Statute. The courts have shown a
tendency to err along similar lines in construing another statute, by cohcluding that
a difference in law spells out a difference in public policy. 3 Three of the justices
took issue with the finding of the minority, disagreeing as to the true interpretation
of the present statute. They found "no express provision in any statute of this
State making invalid here a marriage contract valid in a foreign jurisdiction, even
though such marriage would be unlawful if contracted in this State." This would
seem to be the better view in the light of the fundamental legal principles involved.
This view receives further support when considered along with the interpretation
placed on Section 8 of the New York Domestic Relations Law. This law forbids
a party who has been divorced in this state to remarry during the lifetime of the
complainant except by permission of the court,' and yet, if the party so forbidden
should marry outside the state according to the laws of the foreign jurisdiction, the
statute is interpreted not to make such marriage invalid within this state.3 4
This seems to be the first case to consider this precise question under the statute
as it now stands. In view of the other issues involved in the case, an appeal to the
Court of Appeals is not likely to elicit from that Court an authoritative interpre-
tation of the statute as it now stands.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-NEcESsITY OF INDICTMENT By GRAND JURY-HABEAS
CoRPus.-The relator was indicted by the Grand Jury in the first count for third
degree burglary and in the second count for receiving stolen goods. Relator pleaded
not guilty but three months later, without further action by the grand jury, the
relator withdrew his plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty on the second count of
the indictment to the crime of attempted grand larceny in the second degree. The
indictment neither stated facts sufficient to constitute grand larceny nor was such
crime necessarily included in the crimes charged. After conviction and sentence
the relator obtained a writ of habeas corpus. The lower court dismissed the writ
but remanded the relator to the sheriff to be tried under the indictment on the ground
that the conviction was invalid. The Appellate Division affirmed by a divided
court. Upon appeal, held, order reversed and writ dismissed, three judges dissenting.
People ex rel Wachowicz v. Martin, 293 N. Y. 361, 57 N. E. (2d) 53 (1944).
In dismissing the writ, the majority of the Court of Appeals admitted that the County
universal right, and there being one law of marriage governing all nations alike, subject
only to mere local and not extra-territorial regulations of the State wherein it is cele-
brated, if, at any place where parties may be, whether transiently or permanently, they
enter into what by the' law of the place is marriage, they will be holden everywhere
throughout Christendom to be husband and wife."
32. People v. Daniell, 50 N. Y. 274 (1872); Lyman v. Grammercy Club, 28 App. Div.
30, 50 N. Y. Supp. 1004 (4th Dep't 1898).
33. Comment (1935) 4 FORDHAm L. REv. 89.
34. Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N. Y. 313, 165 N. E. 460 (1929); Moore v. Hegeman, 92
N. Y. 521 (1883).
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Court had erred in sentencing the prisoner for a crime not necessarily included in the in-
dictment.' They recognized that a trial court has no power to amend an indictment to
include a crime not charged therein since the New York Constitution requires that an
accused be held answerable for a felony only upon an indictment of a grand jury.2 The
majority concluded, however, that though the relator's conviction was erroneous, it was
not a nullity and hence not remediable by writ of habeas corpus. Assuming that the
conviction was not wholly void but merely voidable, the holding of the majority
is in accord with the generally observed distinction between the function of a writ
of habeas corpus and that of appellate review. Before a prisoner may successfully
challenge his detention by means of a writ of habeas corpus he must show that the
defect in his conviction rendered the whole proceeding a nullity and was not such
an error as would be correctible by appeal or writ of error.3 As long as the court
has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the process is in good form, the judg-
ment of the court is good until set aside by motion in arrest of judgment or re-
versed upon appeal. 4 When the court lacks jurisdiction so that the judgment is
utterly void, habeas corl~us furnishes the appropriate method of relief.5
The minority of the court, in holding that the relator's conviction was a nullity,
relied upon the decision in People v. Miles.0 There the defendant had been indicted,
and pleaded not guilty, on four counts, three of which charged bribery committed on
May 9th, 1938, the remaining count charging that the defendant contrived and
assisted at a lottery on May 3, 1938. On the trial the District Attorney moved to
amend the indictment by adding a fifth count which charged defendant with having
assisted at a lottery on May 9, 1938. The defendant consented to a granting of the
motion and was convicted on the fifth count. The Court of Appeals held that the
altered charge accused the defendant of a crime separate and distinct from the
one for which he was indicted and reversed the conviction. The minority of the
court in the instant case construed the opinion in the Miles case as indicating a
holding that the error in that case was fundamental. The majority, however, dis-
tinguished the Miles decision on the ground that the decision there was reached after
an appeal and not upon a writ of habeas corpus. Apparently the Miles decision was
1. Section 445 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "the defend-
ant may be found guilty of any crime, the commission of which is necessarily included
in that with which he is charged in the indictment." Larceny is not necessarily included
in the crime of burglary, People v. Snyder, 241 N. Y. 81, 148 N. E. 796 (1925), nor in
the crime of receiving stolen goods, People v Pollack, 154 App. Div. 716, 139 N. Y.
Supp. 831 (2d Dep't 1913).
2. N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, Sec. 6 provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime, . . unless on presentment or indictment of a
grand jury."
3. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 23-24 (1939); Petition of Kelley, 292 Mass. 198,
197 N. E. 861 (1935); People ex rel Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921).
The outstanding decision in New York is People ex rel Tweed v. Luscomb, 60 N. Y. 559
(1875). Comment (1943) 41 Micr. L. REv. 937. 1 BAnmFY, HABAS CoReUs AND SPECmLi
RmIraEiorxs (1913) 84.
4. Matter of Morhous v. Supreme Court of New York, 293 N. Y. 131, 56 N. E. (2d)
79 (1944); People ex rel Weick v. Warden, 117 App. Div. 154, 102 N. Y. Supp. 374 (lst
Dep't 1907); People ex rel Childs v. Knott, 187 App. Div. 604, 622, 176 N. Y. Supp. 321
(lst Dep't 1919).
5. People ex rel Stabile v. Warden, 202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 729 (1911).
6. 289 N. Y. 360, 45 N. E. 910 (1942).
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rejected by the majority as a binding precedent 'because a reversal of the convic-
tion in that case would have been warranted even if the judgment were merely
erroneous and not wholly void.7 Whatever scope the court which handed down the
Miles decision intended it to have, the instant case squarely presents the problem:
is a judgment of conviction, made under the circumstances of the Miles case and
the principal case, an absolute nullity or merely erroneous and correctible by
ordinary methods of judicial review? Such a question, involving, as it does the con-
stitutional right of an accused, warrants an independent examination.
It seems to be well established that even though an indictment fail to state facts
sufficient to constitute a crime, so that the indictment would be demurrable, the
indictment, until questioned, suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the court and a
conviction, based thereon, is'valid until set aside by a motion in arrest of'judgment
or upon appeal.8 It was the opinion of the majority in the principal case that the
"infirmity inherent in a judgment based upon a verdict or plea where the indictment
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any crime is essentially the same as the
infirmity inherent in a judgment based upon a verdict or plea where the indictment
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute the particular crime of which the defend-
ant has been found guilty."9 The soundness of the majority's holding depends upon
the validity of this analogy.
It has been held that an indictment is legally sufficient if it identifies the charge
against the defendant and notifies him of the nature and character of the crime
so that he may prepare his defense. 0 However, the real question presented in the
instant case is not whether the indictment was legally sufficient as stating the crime
of larceny. It was clearly not so. The question is whether the indictment was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court to try and convict the defendant of
the crime for which he was sentenced. In People v. Bogdanoff" the Court of
Appeals by a bare majority upheld the constitutionality of legislation 12 permitting
use of a simplified form of indictment which states merely the name of the crime
without setting forth the act constituting the crime. The court was careful to point
out, however, that the Constitution requires a written accusation of a crime by a
grand jury and that there must be identity of the crime charged with the crime
for which the accused is tried. It would seem, therefore, that a court lacks juris-
diction to convict an accused of a crime for which he has never been indicted.' 3
The majority of the court in the instant case admitted that "the facts alleged
7. "I think that lawyers and judges too often fail to recognize that the decision con-
sists in what is done, not what is said by the court in doing it. Every decision is to)
be read with regard to the facts in the case and the question actually decided.. . . The
courts state general principles but the force of their observations lies in the, application.
of them and this application cannot be predicted with accuracy." Judge Cuthbert W.
Pound, appearing in the introductory quotations of FAucx, LAW AND THE MODERN Mi_.
(1930).
8. People ex rel Schneider v. Hayes, 108 App. Div. 6, 95 N. Y. Supp. 471 (2d Dep't 1905).
9. 293 N. Y. 361, 366, 57 N. E. 53, 55 (1944).
10. People v. Farson, 244 N. Y. 413, 155 N. E. 724 (1927).
11. 254 N. Y. 16, 171 N. E. 890 (1930).
12. Chapter III-A of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, L. 1929, C. 176 au-
thorizing a simplified form of indictment. Sections 295(g) to 295(i) Drovide for the
furnishing of a bill of particulars of the crime by the District Attorney at the request
of the accused.
13. Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1 (1886); 1 BArEY, op. cit. supra, note 3 at 126.
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in the indictment, though sufficient to constitute the crime charged therein, would
not be sufficient to constitute the crime of grand larceny."'14 Nor did the indict-
ment name the crime for which the defendant was convicted. In People ex rel Prince
v. Brophy'0 the defendant was indicted for robbery and pleaded guilty to grand
larceny. That indictment, while demurrable as an indictment for larceny since it
did not set forth facts sufficient to constitute that crime, did at least name a crime,
robbery, which necessarily includes larceny.16 Therefore, the court had jurisdiction,
although the indictment was legally insufficient. In the instant case the indictment
did not even name a crime in which larceny would necessarily be included.
It would seem clear that, upon the question of jurisdiction, the guilty plea of the
defendant cannot obviate the fundamental lack of a written accusation. The con-
stitutional right of a defendant to be convicted only upon an indictment of a grand
jury cannot be waived. 17 It may be assumed that an indictment which either names
the crime or sets forth facts sufficient to indicate the crime may suffice to confer
jurisdiction upon the court to convict a defendant of that crime.' 8 An indictment
which does neither would appear to violate the constitutional requirement and pre-
vent jurisdiction from attaching.' 9 The constitutional provision that no person shall
be held to answer for a crime unless upon an indictment obviously refers to an
indictment for that crime, the crime for which the grand jury intended that he be
held answerable and for which, if innocent, he should be prepared to defend.
14. 293 N. Y. 361, 366, 57 N. E. (2d) 53, 55 (1944).
15. 273 N. Y. 90, 6 N. E. (2d) 109 (1937).
16. People v. Kennedy, 57 Hun 532, 11 N. Y. Supp. 244 (3d Dep't 1890); People v.
Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 153, 155 N. E. 79 (1926).
17. People ex rel Battista v. Christian, 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E. 111 (1928).
18. People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 509-510, 13 N. E. 325, 327-328 (1887); People v.
Miller, 143 App. Div. 251, 128 N. Y. Supp. 549 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd 202 N. Y. 618, 96 N. E.
1125 (1911). If an indictment in one count, in addition to charging one crime, sets forth facts
which would constitute another crime without charging the latter crime, it would not appear
to be bad for duplicity, since the accused can be convicted of only the crime charged. People
v. Klipfel, 160 N. Y. 371, 54 N. E. 788 (1899). It might be that the indictment would
be deemed sufficient to provide the court with jurisdiction to convict the accused of
the crime described but not charged. (Section 275 of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure requires merely "A plain and concise statement of the act constituting the
crime . . .") This might be so even where the facts set forth are insufficient legally to
constitute the crime not named but sufficient in point of fact to inform the accused that
the grand jury accuses him of an act which, if properly stated, would constitute a crime
Larceny might be sufficiently set forth in an indictment charging the crime of receivinf
stolen property (see People v. Brien, 53 Hun 496 (1st Dep't 1889) or in one charging
burglary (see People v. Wilson, 151 N. Y. 403, 45 N. E. 862 (1897).
19. In the federal courts the scope of the inquiry upon a writ of habeas corpus
which at common law was limited to questions of jurisdiction, has been extended br
statute (Act of February 5, 1867, C. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 28 U. S. C. A. 453) to all case
of persons restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution or law of Congres-
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). The New York courts have not as yc
(though this mzay be done in the future) extended the scope of inquiry under the wr
beyond jurisdictional grounds to an investigation into questions of due process. Morho.
v. Supreme Court of New York, 293 N. Y. 131, 56 N. E. (2d) 79 (1944).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SELF-INcRIMINATION-WAIVER OF THE PRVILEGE:-The
defendant was charged with assault with intent to rape. There was no direct
evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime. The State, in under-
taking to identify him as the guilty person, relied to a great extent on his alleged
ownership of a hat which was concededly found at the scene of the crime and
which admittedly was worn by the actual culprit. Upon being shown the hat prior
to the trial the defendant, after trying it on, admitted ownership of it to the
arresting police officers but asserted it had been stolen from him a few days before
the crime was committed. This testimony and that of another State's witness was
introduced to identify the hat as one belonging to the defendant. The defendant
voluntarily took the witness stand and denied ownership of the hat. On cross-exami-
nation, the defendant was asked to put on the hat for size. His counsel objected
but the court instructed him to put it on. Defendant was convicted. Upon appeal,
held, judgment reversed and new trial granted. Allen v. State, - Md.---, 39 A.
(2d) 820 (1944).
The privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed by our Federal Constitution
to all persons tried in federal courts' and the guaranty is included in most state
constitutions. 2 The guaranty itself is expressed by the common law maxim: Nemo
tenetur seipsum accusare.3 Its purpose is not to shelter or afford refuge to a guilty
person but rather to relieve him of the necessity of producing testimony against
himself.4 The privilege as it exists today, in both England and America5 is personal
to the witness.0 Some courts have interpreted the privilege as of so personal a na-
ture that it must be personally claimed by the witness even when he is the accused
and cannot be claimed by his counsel. 7 Some courts which require this personal
1. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... " U. S. CoNsT. AMN. V. For a history of the privilege see 8 WioGoRE,
EVIDExcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2250; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 18 (1908); in America,
Pittman, 'The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimnina-
tion in America (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 763.
2. Maryland is among the states having the guaranty in their constitution. "No man
ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case." MD. CONST.
Declaration of Rights, Art. 22.
3. BROOM, LEGAL MAxIMs (10th ed. 1939) 660. It is questioned whether the guaranty
was uniformly followed at common law or even protected by Magna Charta. Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908). However, in the Allen case it is stated: "It was re-affirmed
in Magna Charta." Allen v. State, - Md. -, 39 A. (2d) 820, 821 (1944).
4. ". . . protection against being brought by means of his own evidence within the
penalties of the law." Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 366 (1917) quoting Cock-
burn, C. J., with approval in The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 329, 330 (1861). See
Frank J., dissenting in United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
5. The privilege is not as fully realized and effective in other than the common law
jurisdictions. In France and Germany an inference may be drawn from the accused's re-
fusal to answer. See 8 WIoGoRz, EviDEcE (3d ed. 1940) 302, n. 114.
6. 3 WHARTON, CRiarn-AL EVmENCF (11th ed. 1935) § 1143. Similarly the privilege is
available to persons and not to corporations which are creatures of the state and subject
to the mandates of the creating government. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
7. State v. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234 (1875); Roddy v. Finnegan, 43 Md. 490 (1876);
Bradford v. People, 22 Colo. 157, 43 Pac. 1013 (1896); State v. Pancoast, 5 N. D. 516,
67 N. W. 1052 (1896) ; ex parte Miers, 124 Tex. Cr. R. 592, 64 S. W. (2d) 778 (1933).
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claim take the position that the sanctity of the oath under which the witness takes
the stand is enough to preclude him from falsely assuming the privilege.8 How-
ever, this would appear to be too rigid an interpretation of this protection furnished
by the Bill of Rights. A better view would permit the accused or his counsel to
claim the privilege. The privity between defense counsel and his client taken to-
gether with the former's role as protector of the latter's rights and especially the
usual defendant's lack of knowledge of the niceties of constitutional law9 would
seem to support those courts which hold that even counsel may claim the privilege
for the accused who is testifying. 10
As this court says, 1 the privilege may be waived. 12 The defendant in a criminal
prosecution is never compelled to be a witness. But he may doff the protective cloak
thrown about him by the law and take the stand in his own defense. By this act
he subjects himself to cross-examination. 13 Because of the strength of protection of
the original guaranty, the defendant may not obtain the benefit of his testimony
denying guilt and then retreat behind the protective veil of the privilege in order
to exempt himself from answering questions relevant to the very facts which he
has by his own testimony put in issue. The great weight of authority holds that
having waived the privilege, he is then to be treated "as any other witness."' 4 But
determination of the extent of the questioning to which he may then be subjected
is difficult to define because of the fact that he is distinguishable from other wit-
nesses, in that he goes on the stand voluntarily whereas the ordinary witness may
8. State v. Pancoast, 5 N. D. 516, 67 N. W. 1052 (1896) ; State v. Kelley, 118 Or. 397,
247 Pac. 146 (1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 589 (1927) ; Chesapeake Club v. State, 63 Md.
446 (1885).
9. "The maxim 'a man is presumed to know the law,' is a trite, sententious saying,
'by no means universally true.' Ignorance of the law does not excuse persons so as to
exempt thqem from the consequences of their acts, such as punishment for criminal offenses
. ..we may say that all persons are treated as if they knew the law in passing on the
character of their acts. In that qualified sense is knowledge of the law imputed to every
one." Municipal Metallic Bed Mfg. Corp. v. Dobbs, 253 N. Y. 313, 317, 171 N. E. 75,
76 (1930). See Kennedy, Portrait of the New Supreme Court II, supra p. 28. Some
courts, however, held that it is incumbent on the courts to advise the witness of this
privilege. Cullen v. Com., 24 Grat. 624 (Va. 1874). Where he has been so warned there-
fore, he may be assumed to know the law. Other courts even go so far in this presumptive
knowledge of the law as to hold that a witness need not necessarily be advised of this
privilege by the court. Burke v. State, 104 Ohio St. 220, 135 N. E. 644 (1922); People v.
Smith, 257 Mich. 319, 241 N. W. 186 (1932).
10. Cliffton v. Granger, 86 Iowa 573, 53 N. W. 316 (1892); People v. Brown, 72 N. Y.
571, 573 (1878).
11. Allen v. State, 39 A. (2d) 820, 824 (1944).
12. Fries v. Brugler, 12 N. J. L. 79 (Sup. Ct. 1830); Cloyes v. Thayer, 3 Hill. 564
(N. Y. 1842); Ex parte Senior, 37 Fla. 1, 19 So. 652 (1896); McCreery v. Ghormley, 9
App. Div. 221, 41 N. Y. Supp. 167 (2d Dep't 1896); People v. Cassidy, 164 App. Div.
15, 149 N. Y. Supp. 358 (2d Dep't 1914) aff'd 213 N. Y. 388, 107 N. E. 713 (1915);
United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931) rev'g 51 F. (2d) 389 (S. D. Ill. 1930).
13. People v. Cassidy, 164 App. Div. 15, 149 N. Y. Supp. 358 (2d Dep't 1914), aff'd
213 N. Y. 388, 107 N. E. 713 (1915).
14. 1 COOLE-t, CoNsTITuTIoNAL Lm-nuaTONs (8th ed. 1927) 661-662; UNDERELL, CRI-
NAL EvIDENcE (4th ed. 1935) § 139; Donahue v. People, 56 N. Y. 208 (1874).
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be compelled to testify. Does the voluntary character of his role destroy his privilege
against self-incrimination completely? It would seem not.15 It is universally agreed
that "his voluntary offer of testimony upon any fact is a waiver as to all other rele-
vant facts, because of the necessary connection between all."'16 The erasure of his
privilege by this voluntary act of taking the stand is subject to three separate con-
structions by the courts. The most narrow view is that the cross-examination is lim-
ited to the subject matter of the direct examination.17 Another and broader view,
and the one adopted by the court in the principal case,' 8 is that the cross-examina-
tion should extend to all matters pertinent to the issue on trial.19 An even wider
extension of the waiver would extend to all facts even those merely affecting cred-
ibility.20 Even adopting the narrowest interpretation, ownership of the hat was part
of the subject matter of the direct examination. It is submitted that it was a rele-
vant fact in issue and would be proper material for cross-examination.
Passing further comment on waiver, it is submitted that the trial court was cor-
rect in requiring the defendant t6 try on the hat. The generality of the constitutional
guaranty has caused the courts to differ widely. It is commonly agreed that it extends
to all "testimonial utterances" 21 of the witness. "Testimony" is to be carefully dis-
tinguished from the broader term "evidence. '22 Testimony is generally limited as
applying to oral or written communications by a witness.23 Therefore, where the
constitutional inhibition precludes a witness from giving testimony against himself,24
the majority of the courts are agreed that this does not apply to such real evidence
as is produced by his body itself for "what is obtained is not testimony about
the accused's body, but his body itself, and consequently the privilege is not vio-
15. 8 WiGarox, EVIDENCE § 2276 (2). However, some cases hold the waiver is com-
plete. Le More ,v. United States, 253 Fed. 887 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918) ; cert. denied, 248 U. S.
586 (1919); State v. Hale, 85 N. H. 403, 160 Atl. 95 (1932).
16. 8 WIGMoR, EVIDENCE p. 441.
17. People v. Arrigbini, 122 Cal. 121, 54 Pac. 591 (1898).
18. In the instant case the court cites Guy v. State, 90 Md. 29, 33, 44 Ad. 997, 998
(1899) wherein the court refused the "narrow construction" which provides that the
accused be held on cross-examination, as waiving the privilege as to any matter about
which he has given testimony in chief. They adopted rather the broader and better rule
of Massachusetts, New York, Illinois and Connecticut that when the accused voluntarily
becomes a witness in his own behalf "he may be cross-examined 'concerning any matter
pertinent to the issue on trial, regardless of the extent of the direct examination."
19. This is the most widely adopted view. See State v. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234, 243
(1875).
20. People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 30 N. E. 494 (1892).
21. 3 WHARTON, CamruiAL EVIDENCE (11th ed. 1935) 1979.
22. Zipus v. United Rys. & Electric Co., 135 Md. 297, 108 At. 884, 887 (1919).
23. Bouvier defines testimony as "the statement made by a witness under oath or
affiirmation." (Italics inserted) 3 BouviER, Lmw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914) 3264.
24. Some constitutions and statutes read so as to protect the witness from giving testi-
mony against himself, GEORGIA CoNsT. Art. I § 1. ff 6. "No person shall be compelled to
give testimony tending in any manner to criminate himself;" or from being a witnesi
against himself, U. S. CONST. A.fEND. V, supra note 1; N. Y. CONST. Art. I § 6, "No
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...
Others protect him from giving evidence against himself. MD. CoNsT. Art. 22, supra note 2.
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lated."2 Even where the statutory inhibition is, against requiring witness to give
"evidence" 20 against himself, bodily exhibition has been held not to be evidence
of the accused. 27 Therefore he may be compelled to assume his normal aspect for
identification. So it has been held not to violate his privilege to have the accused
pointed to in court,28 or even to require him to do some affirmative act,29 such as
standing,30 removing his glasses, 1 removing a beard,32 having his fingerprints33
or footprints34 taken, putting on a cap,8 5 showing his arm to the jury36 or even
dressing him in clothing similar to that worn by the guilty person and assuming
that aspect to aid in identification.3 7 These latter acts were required for the pur-
pose of direct identification by a witness. The identification with the guilty may
also be proved circumstantially by using his body to establish ownership of identi-
fying things. The courts have required an accused to don a blouse found at the
scene of the crime for size 8 or a garment to show coincidence of cuts in that
garment and scars on his body.39 The probative value of such evidence may be
small. However, the instant decision questions its competency.
25. State v. Barela, 23 N. M. 395, 168 Pac. 545 (1917). See also Ross v. State, 204
Ind. 281, 182 N. E. 865 (1932); O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137 (1895);
(1903) 16 HARV. L. REV. 300.
26. See supra note 24.
27. The court in State v. Flynn, 36 N. Y. 64 (1858) says: "The information thus ac-
quired is not the admission of the party, nor evidence given by him, in any sense. The
party has in his power certain mute witnesses, as they may be called, which he endeavors
to keep out of sight, so that they may not disclose the facts which he is desirous to con-
ceal ... they are examined, to see what evidence they bear. That evidence is their's, not
their owner's."
28. State v. Johnson, 67 N. C. 55 (1872).
29. People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003 (1894).
30. State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926). There is a distinction made be-
tween cases in which the defendant is required merely to remain passive and those in
which he was required to exercise volition, the latter being regarded as a violation of
the constitutional privilege. The distinction is of doubtful validity. See (1918) 27 YALE L. J.
412.
31. Rutherford v. State, 135 Tex. Cr. 530, 121 S. W. (2d) 342 (1938).
32. People v. Strauss, 174 Misc. 881, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 155 (County Ct. 1940); See
(1941) 10 FORDHAm L. REV. 135.
33. People v. Sallow, 100 Misc. 447, 165 N. Y. Supp. 915 (Gen. Sess. 1917) ; Duree
v. United States, 297 Fed. 70 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Garcia v. State, 26 Ariz., 597, 229
Pac. 103 (1924).
34. State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646 (1876); State v. Barela, 23 N. M. 395, 168 Pac. 545
(1917) Contra: Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667 (1879); People v. Wolcott, 51 Mich. 612, 17
N. W. 78 (1883).
35. People v. Pecho, 362 Ill. 568, 200 N. E. 860 (1936).
36. State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79 (1879).
37. Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 182 N. E. 865 (1932) in which the defendant was
forced to grow a beard and had a handkerchief placed below his eyes, in order to be
identified.
38. Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910). Contra: Ward v. State, 27 Okla. Cr.
362, 228 Pac. 498, 499 (1924).
39. State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926).
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It is submitted that it would be grossly exaggerating the purpose and policy of
this constitutional guaranty to allow the accused to hinder determination of a fact
pertinent to the issue, by shielding himself behind a privilege whose purpose is to
further, not to obstruct justice. While the authorities are divided, and while the
courts should usually construe a constitutional guaranty in favor of personal rights,
still we must guard against the abuses of a privilege which has from early time
been questioned 40
CRImINAL LAw-LARCENY-INTENT-PENAL LAW SEC. 1307-Defendant was con-
victed of larceny in the first degree for the theft of a ring and lavaliere. On the
trial the Court eliminated frcm the consideration of the jury any question of the
defendant's intention to restore the jewelry, although the jewelry had been restored
to the owner before the commencement of the criminal prosecution. The Trial Court
also refused defense counsel's request to charge the jury that they should acquit the
defendant if they found that at the time she took the jewelry she intended to re-
store it. Upon appeal, held, conviction reversed, two justices dissenting. Evidence of
defendant's intention to restore the jewelry was proper for the jury's c(nsideration
and the requested charge should have been given. People v. Kaye, - App. Div.
-, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 742 (2d Dep't, 1945).
At common law larceny required an intent to deprive the owner of his property
permanently.1 The taking of property only for a temporary use, with the intent
to restore the property, was held not to be larcenous. 2 From a superficial reading
of the well known case of Regiua v. Trebilcock,3 one might conclude that it stood
for the proposition that mere intent to restore existing at the time of the alleged
larceny, without reasonable expectation that the means to do so would be available,
never constitutes a defense. However, it would appear that the extent of the actual
holding in that case was merely that the jury might infer from the defendant's
40. See II BENTnAm, RATIONALE Or JuDIcaL EvoiENcE (Bowring's ed. 1827) 452 as
quoted in' 8 VIONORE, EViDNcE 305.
1. STEPHENS, CgmrmAL LAW (6th ed. 1904) Art. 321, 332; MAY, Cnm7AL LAW (4th
ed. 1938) § 240.
2. Regina v. Holloway, 2 C. & K. 942, 175 Eng. Rep. R. 395 (N. P. 1849) in which
the court held that a worker, paid according to the number of skins he dressed, who
took some already dressed skins and presented them as his own handiwork to the fore-
man for compensation was not guilty of larceny because at no time had the worker
claimed ownership or -denied his master's immediate right to possession. But in Rex v.
Hall, 3 C. & P. 409, 172 Eng. Rep. R. 477 (N. P. 1828), a workman was held guilty of
larceny for taking some fat from his master's storehouse and pretending that it was
brought in for sale, because the workman had intended to permanently deprive his mas-
ter of all his rights in the fat. Combining both these viewpoints, the court in Rex v.
Crump, I C. & P. 658, 171 Eng. Rep. R. 1357 (N. P. 1825) held the defendant, who
had taken a horse and a bag of articles, not guilty of larceny as to the horse which he
abandoned after several miles, but guilty as to the bag of articles which he kept in his
possession; the court apparently holding that the defendant had only taken the horse as
a means of travel with no intent to deprive the owner of it permanently.
3. 7 Cox C. C. 408, 169 Eng. Rep. R. 1079 (C. R. Cas. 1858) (defendant was found
guilty of larceny but the jury recommended mercy).
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lack of means to make restoration, the fact that he had no real intention to make
restoration. 4 In this country some courts have 'seemingly extended the holding in
Regina v. Trebilcock and have in effect ruled that intent to deprive the owner per-
manently of his property will be presumed as a matter of law from the circumstances
of the case.5 In these cases the courts have generally resorted to the commonly
used fiction that a person will be presumed to have intended the natural and
probable consequences of his acts. Resort to this over-worked maxim often involves
no more than the application of the objective test of intent.6 In such a case, the
court substitutes for actual intent to steal, as it has been known to the common
law, circumstances which it deems to be the equivalent of such intent.7
In New York the courts appear to adhere strictly to the constitutional require-
ment s that all of the essential elements of ra crime, including the mens rea of the
accused, must be found as a fact by the jury.9 It is true that under the principles
of logic,' 0 a jury may infer from the happening of a certain result that the accused
intended that result. But that is not equivalent to requiring the jury to make such
4. Lord Campbell, C. J., after pointing out that there was abundant evidence to jus-
tify a finding of larcenous intent apparently construed the jury's recommendation of
mercy as based upon a subsequently formed intention to restore. This may be clearly
seen from a colloquy between two of the justices; "Coleridge, J. But in this case the
jury does not say that at the time of the taking the prisoner intended to return the plate.
Lord Campbell, C. J. On the contrary they negative it by finding him guilty." 7 Cox's
Criminal Cases 408, 411, 169 Eng. Rep. R. 1079, 1081 (Cr. Cas. 1858).
5. State v. Davis, 38 N. J. L. 176 (1875). Defendant took a horse and buggy, drove
the horse in a reckless manner, and abandoned it several miles away, the horse being
thoroughly exhausted from driving and want of food. The defendant made no effort
to notify the owner where the horse and buggy could be found or to put them in a
secure place for the night. The court presumed as a matter of law from these circum-
stances that the defendant intended to deprive the owner permanently of his property
and he was convicted of larceny. State v. Von Buren, 7 Boyce 79, 102 At. 981 (Del. Gen.
Sess. 1918); Commonwealth v. Weston, 241 Mass. 131, 135 N. E. 465 (1922) State v.
Ward, 19 Nev. 297, 10 Pac. 133 (1886); Gardiner v. State, 55 N. J. L. 17, 26 At.
30 (1892), aff'd 55 N. J. L. 62, 30 AtI. 429 (1893).
6. The objective test of criminal intent is suggested by Holmes, J., "I am aware of
course that the word intent as vaguely used in ordinary legal discussion means no more
than knowledge at the time of the, act that the consequences said to be intended will
ensue. Even less than that will satisfy the general principle of civil and criminal liability.
A man may have to pay damages, may be sent to prison, at common law might he
hanged, if at the time of his act he knew facts from which common experience showed
that the consequences would follow, whether he individually could foresee them or not."
Diss. op. in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 626 (1919).
7. See note 5, supra.
8. N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 2 which guarantees the right of trial by jury as provided in
§ 2. This right may be waived except in cases involving capital punishment, but as yet
the legislature has passed no legislation governing such waiver.
9. People v. Baker, 96 N. Y. 340, 350 (1884).
10. THAYER, A PRE nnxARY TREATIsE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COmmoN LAW (Ist ed
1898) 271. "Let it be distinctly set down, then, that the whole process of legal argumen-
tation, and the rules for it, essential as these are, and forever pressing upon the atten-
tion, are mainly an affair of logic and general experience, itot of legal precept."
[Vol. 14
1945] RECENT DECISIONS
an inference, or what is the same-from depriving the jury ,of the power to draw
a contrary inference. Accordingly, it seems settled in New York that it is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to determine whether the defendant had, at the time of
the alleged larceny, the intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently. 1
The instant case involved this very point, since the Trial Court excluded from
the jury's consideration the defendant's alleged intent to restore the jewelry, even
though the jewelry had been restored before criminal proceedings were instituted.
The dissenting opinion in effect held that the enactment of Section 1307, of the
Penal Law' 2 has modified the common law by elimination of intention to restore
as a defense. The majority held that the intention to restore was relevant under
the section. ,This section reads:
"The mere fact that the defendant intended to restore the property stolen or em-
bezzled, is no ground of defense, or of mitigation of punishment, if it has not been
restored before complaint to a magistrate, charging the commission of the crime."
The conflicting views of the majority and the minority opinions in -the principal case
and the confusion which is apparent not only in previous decisions' 3 of the New
York courts but also in the decisions in other jurisdictions 14 construing similar
statutory provisions' 6 call for an examination of Section 1307 and the decisions
construing it. Aside from the question of mitigation of punishment, there are three
possible interpretations of the legislative intent which may be placed upon Section
1307 of the Penal Law in so far as it bears upon the anitnus furandi: First, that
the statute entirely eliminates an intention to restore -as a defense; Second, that
it makes an intent to restore formed subsequent to the theft a complete defense,
11. People v. Kenney, 135 App. Div. 380, 119 N. Y. Supp. 854 (1st Dep't 1909).
12. Section derived from N. Y. PExAL CODE, § 549, N. Y. Laws 1881, c. 676. The
section (1307) as it now stands is almost a literal transcript of section 609 of the draft
proposed Penal Code submitted to the Legislature in 1865, where it was proposed in
relation to the then statutory crime of embezzlement.
13. Parr v. Loder, 97 App. Div. 218, 89 N. Y. Supp. 823 (2d Dep't 1904), app'l disrn'd,
182 N. Y. 509, 74 N. E. 1121 (1905) (holding that the statute presumed the property
had been stolen at some prior time); People v. Meadows, 199 N. Y. 1, 92 N. E. 128
(1910), aff'g, 136 App. Div. 226, 121 N. Y. Supp. 17 (4th Dep't 1910) (which merely
restated the statute); People v. Shears, 158 App. Div. 577, 143 N. Y. Supp. 861 (2d Dep't
1913), aff'd mere., 209 N. Y. 610, 103 N. E. 1129 (1913) (intent to restore formed sub-
sequently is no defense) ; (dicta in both of the following cases permitted intent to restore
formed subsequent as a good defense) Ehrenreich v. Fox Film Corp., 198 App. Div. 10,
15, 189 N. Y. Supp. 488, 491 (1st Dep't 1921); De Long v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., 142 Misc. 654, 256 N. Y. Supp. 300 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd 238 App. Div.
760, 262 N. Y. Supp. 165 (4th Dep't 1933).
14. People v. Kay, 34 Cal. App. (2d) 691, 94 P. (2d) 361 (1939); People v. Harris,
100 Cal. App. 78, 280 Pac. 178 (1929); People v. Kirwin, 87 Cal. App. 783, 262 Pac.
803 (1927); People v. Jackson, 138 Cal. 462, 71 Pac. 566 (1903); Pitcher v. People, 16
Mich. 142 (1867) ; the cases construing the Texas statute (§ 1424 of the Penal Code which
really provides for mitigation, but which serves as a defense) involve for the most part
the question of what is meant by a voluntary return. TEx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1926)
art. 1424, n. 1.
15. CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1941) § 512; OxLA. STAT. ANN. (Harlow, 1942) tit. 21
§ 460; TEx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1926) art. 424; MIcHr. ComP. LAWS (1857) § 5765
(no longer any provision of this nature).
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if the goods have actually been restored before complaint has been made to a magis-
trate; Third, that it preserves the common law requirement of intent to deprive the
owner of his property permanently where the goods have actually been restored
before complaint has been made, but that it eliminates intent to restore where the
goods have not actually been restored before complaint.
The first interpretation which entirely eliminates the intention to restore as a
defense was adopted by the minority opinion in the instant case, relying on the
authority of People v. Shears.' The minority opinion contended that the Shears
case had interpreted the statute as if it contained two separate sections, to wit,
"(1) The fact that the defendant intended to restore the property stolen or em-
bezzled is no ground of defense. (2) The fact that the defendant intended to restore
the property stolen or embezzled is no ground of mitigation of punishment, 'if it has
not been restored before complaint to a magistrate, charging the commission of a
crime.' "17 It would seem, however, that the majority was correct in holding not
only that no such interpretation had been made in the Shears case but also that
the statute is in a single sentence and the words italicized depend for their "mean-
ing upon the primary command with which the sentence opens."' 8 The cases cited
by the minority' 9 construing a California statute allegedly supporting their conten-
tion are not controlling since they interpret a section of the California statute
which is non-existent in New York2 ' and which deals with actual restoration and
not at all with intent. The majority might well have advanced another cogent argu-
ment against the first interpretation. As we have seen, at common law evidence of
intention to restore was always admissible as bearing on the question of the feloni-
ous intent required by the definition of the crime. The minority's interpretation
of the Penal Law Section 1307 would ascribe to the. legislature an intention to make
a radical departure from the common law. It is a well settled rule of statutory inter-
pretation that such an intention must be plainly and unequivocally expressed.22 Sec-
tion 1293-A of the Penal Law23 provides that intent to restore motor vehicles or
airplanes taken without the consent of the owner is not a defense. If, as the minor-
ity claimed, Section 1307 is to be interpreted- as providing that intent to restore
is no defense, what need was there for Section 1293-A? We may conclude that the
legislature contemplated no such interpretation of Section 1307 as claimed by the
minority here.
The second interpretation does not seem to be justified. The common law gen-
16. People v. Shears, 158 App. Div. 577, 143 N. Y. Supp. 861 (2d Dep't 1913), aff'd
nem., 209 N. Y. 610, 103 N. E. 1129 (1913).
17. People v. Kaye, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 742, 748 (2d Dep't 1945).
18. Tyrrell v. The Mayor, 159 N. Y. 239, 243, 53 N. E. 1111, 1113 (1899).
19. McLaughlin v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 15 Cal. App. (2d) 558, 59 P. (2d) 631
(1936); Pleople v. Kay, 34 Cal. App. (2d) 691, 94 P. (2d) 361 (1939); People v. Baker,
64 Cal. App. 336, 221 Pac. 654 (1923). The other two cases cited by the minority involve
both §§ 512 and 513 of the California Penal Code; People v. Harris, 100 Cal. App. 78,
280 Pac. 178 (1929); People v. Kirwin, 87 Cal. App. 783, 262 Pac. 803 (1927).
20. CAL. PzN. CODE (Deering, 1941) § 513.
21. Section 512 of the California Penal Code, however, is almost identical with sec-
tion 1307 of the New York Penal Code.
22. N. Y. STATuTEs § 301.
23. Added N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 514; amended N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 621; N. Y. Laws
1922, c. 500; N. Y. Laws 1928, c. 373, eff. Sept. 1, 1928.
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erally afforded no locus poenitentiae for a crime committed.24 Some statutes have
done so to the extent of permitting mitigation of punishment. 25 Such legislation
would seem to be unnecessary in view of the full discretion vested in judges when
pronouncing sentence.26 It is certain that the language of Penal Law Section 1307
contains no affirmative declaration of a legislative intention to provide a locus poeni-
tentiae. The dicta in a few New York cases 27 construing the statute as permitting
a locus poetitentiae are unsafe authority for the contention that the legislature in-
tended such a rule plainly in derogation of the common law.
The third interpretation is the most logical and justifiable. To the extent that
the court construed the statute as permitting proof of an intention to restore, formed
at the time of taking, the decision of the majority appears to be correct. There
is no language in the statute manifesting an intention to eliminate the common law
concept of animus furandi and the provision should be construed, in case of doubt,
as declaratory of the common law. 28 Since the jewelry was actually restored before
complaint to a magistrate, it was not necessary for the court to consider whether a
failure to restore the goods would have precluded defendant from introducing evi-
dence of such an intent formed at the time of the taking. It is submitted, however,
that this may well have been the principal purpose for the enactment of Penal Law
Section 1307. However, any such interpretation is faced with the necessity of ex-
plaining the use of the words "stolen or embezzled." But, it is certainly arguable
that when the legislature referred to property "stolen or embezzled," the legislature
did not intend that these adjectives be accorded their strict legal import. In law
property may be considered "stolen or embezzled" when it has been taken or con-
verted with an intent to deprive the owner of it permanently. In layman's parlance,
however, property might be considered "stolen or embezzled" when it is wrongfully
taken or converted even though without the precise intent required for larceny
or embezzlement. It is submitted that the legislature may well have intended the
latter connotation. After all, the word "stolen" is susceptible of varying interpreta-
tions29 and the word "embezzled" describes a crime not of common law, but of"
24. Regina v. Poynton, Le. & Ca. 247, 169 Eng. Rep. R. 1383 (Cr. Cas. 1862); Regina
v. Wells, 1 F. & F. 109, 175 Eng. Rep. R. 648 (N. P. 1858); Regina v. Peters, 1 Car. & K.
245, 174 Eng. Rep. R. 795 (N. P. 1843).
25. CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1941) § 513; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Harlow, 1941) tit. 21,
§ 1461; TEx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1926) art. 1424; see also, Robinson v. State, 113 Ind.
510, 16 N. E. 184 (1888); United States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1318, No. 15,205 (N. D.
Ohio 1873) (cases, in the absence of a statute, which consider restoration in mitigation
of the offense.)
26. 1 WiHARTON, CnA mAL LAiv (12th ed. 1932) § 44.
27. Ehrenreich v. Fox Film Corp., 198 App. Div. 10, 15, 189 N. Y. Supp. 488, 491 (1st
Dep't 1921) in.which the reference to Section 1307 was entirely unnecessary since the
evidence established conclusively an intent to restore existing at the time of the taking.
De Long v. Massachusetts Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 142 Misc. 654, 656, 256 N. Y.
Supp. 300, 302 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd 238 App. Div. 760, 262 N. Y. Supp. 165 (4th Dep't
1933) in which the reference to Section 1307 was also unnecessary to the decision.
28. See note 22, supra.
29. State v. Mayer, 209 Mo. 391, 395, 107 S. W. 1085, 1086 (1908). "The word 'stolen'
means that a larceny or theft has been committed. . . ."; Laird v. Employers Liability
Assur. Corporation, Ltd., of London, England, 18 A. (2d) 861, 862 (1941). "Our own
courts have frequently referred to stealing as synonymous with larceny."; United States
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purely statutory, origin3o Limit the words "stolen or embezzled" to mean "taken"
and the difficulty is resolved. There is some precedent in New York for such an
interpretation. 3 ' A compound fact (taken or converted with intent, etc.) was ap-
parently stated when only a simple fact (taken) was intended. Any other con-
struction would emasculate the statute and reduce it to a mere codification of
a rule of the common law so obvious that it cotild hardly call for a statutory
restatement.
DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY-UNFAIR COMPETITION-FRAUD--NEGLGENT STATE-
MENTS.-Plaintiff, a music publisher, charged defendants, a manufacturer of tobacco
products and its advertising agency, with falsely representing to the public that the
nine or ten current tunes played upon defendants' weekly radio program, "Your Hit
Parade," were the outstanding song hits of the week as determined by an accurate and
extensive poll or survey conducted by defendants. Plaintiff asserted that defendants'
choice of selections was arbitrary and made without regard to any such public poll;
that as a result, popular songs published by plaintiff were, often inaccurately rated
on defendants' program or omitted altogether, thereby injuring plaintiff's reputation
and business as a music publisher. Plaintiff requested injunctive relief, as well as
damages arising from two additional causes of action based upon fraud and gross
negligence. Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint was denied. Upon appeal,
held, order reversed on the ground that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient
to constitute cause of action. Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., -
App. Div. -, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 337 (1st Dep't 1945).
The tort known as disparagement of pr6perty is generally actionable at law.' While
there is authority favoring the intervention of equity in a proceeding to enjoin
a bare disparagement of property,2 such does not appear to be the law of New York.
It has long been established in this state that equity will not enjoin the publication
of a libel which may be injurious to the character or business of a plaintiff, since the
legal remedy is generally deemed adequate.3 For that reason equity appears to require
v. Adcock, 49 F. Supp. 351, 353 (W. D. Ken. 1943). "I am of the opinion that the
word 'stolen' is used in the statute not in the technical sense of what constitutes larceny,
but in its well known and accepted meaning of taking the personal property of another
for one's own use without right or law ..
30. 1 BIsHop, C1IuMxNAL LAw (9th ed. 1923) § 567 (2).
31. People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 110, 112, 16 N. E. 529, 530 (1888). The court said:
"In the first clause of this provision, the endeavor to state and describe one fact has in-
volved the statement of another, changing a simple int6 a compound fact. ... )
1. NEWELL, SLANDER AND LiBEL.(4th ed. 1924) 196; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 276.
2. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29
HARv. L. REV. 640; Nims, Unfair Competition by False Statements or Disparagement (1933)
19 CoRN. L. Q. 63; Smith, Disparagement of Property (1913) 13 CoL. L. Rxv. 13; Note
(1945) 33 GEORGETowN L. J. 213. For a lucid judicial discussion of this position, see Black
& Yates v. Mahogany Assn., 129 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941). However, it is generally
held that ". . . it is not actionable for a man to commend his own goods, or to advertise
that he can make as good articles as any other person in the trade." NEWELL, SLANDER AND
LIBEL (4th ed. 1924) 208.
3. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N. Y. 1839). "It is very evident that this court
RECENT DECISIONS
some element in addition to the bare act of libel, such as publication of the dis-
paraging statements in the course of trade by a business rival, thus opening the
door to the more inclusive tort of unfair competition.,4
A common example of unfair competition consists in the "palming-off" of the
goods of one trader for those of another,5 although it has been suggested that actions
in unfair competition are no longer confined to such instances.6 However, the doc-
trine of "pahning-off"-in fact the very name applied to the tort, unfair competition
-suggests a requisite which should logically underlie every such action-viz., direct
competition between the parties to the action. Direct competition, as here used,
refers to the effort of the parties, acting independently, to secure the patronage of a
third party by the offer of the most favorable terms. 7 In Marlin Fire Arms Co. v.
Shields8 a manufacturer of firearms sought to restrain the publisher of a magazine
from printing unjust and malicious misrepresentations about plaintiff's products.
Although the plaintiff alleged that he had no adequate remedy at law because of his
inability to prove special damage, the Court of Appeals denied the injunction, hold-
ing that the cause of action was not one properly within the province of equity juris-
cannot assume jurisdiction of the case presented by the complainant's bill, or of any other
case of the like nature, without infringing upon the liberty of the press, and attempting
to exercise a power of preventive justice which . . . cannot safely be entrusted to any
tribunal consistently with the principles of a free government." Id. at 26. The issue of
free speech does not appear to have been raised in the instant case, although a federal
court dealing with this subject recently remarked that "The irrelevance of 'free speech'
and of 'a libel is for a jury' are patent." Black & Yates v. Mahogany Assn., 129 F. (2d)
227 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
4. In his article on unfair competition, Nims suggests that "the language of the courts
indicates an increasing willingness to recognize the need for adequate relief from disparage-
ment of goods by a competitor." Again, he notes a "growing feeling" that the use of false
and defamatory statements is not a fair method of competition. Nims,. Unfair Competition
by False Statements or Disparagement (1933) 19 Com'. L. Q. 63, 66, 70. Judge. Clark, in
Black & Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F. (2d) 227, 230 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), refers
to the "judicial slothfulness" of equity courts in hesitating' to accept jurisdiction in dis-
paragement cases.
5. Neva-Wet Corp. of America v. Never Wet Processing Corp., 277 N. Y. 163, 168,
13 N. E. (2d) 755, 758 (1938); Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corp., 128 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 7th,
1942), in which it was held that even though defendant's trademark was similar to that
previously adopted by plaintiff no action lay in infair competition, since defendant, a
manufacturer of cereal products, had not sought to palm off his goods as those of plaintiff,
a magazine publisher. See also Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion
Bolt and Mfg. Co., 124 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) ; Colson Corp. v. Pierce Mfg.
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 900 (W. D. N. Y., 1941); R. C. A. Mfg. Co. v. Columbia Recording
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 247 (S. D. N. Y., 1940) ; Louis' Restaurant v. Coffey, 132 Misc. 690,
230 N. Y. Supp. 82 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
6 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 241 (1918); Allen
Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 191, 229 N. Y. Supp. 692, 698 (4th Dep't 1928).
7. "The effort of two or more parties, acting independently, to secure the custom of
a third party by the offer of the most favorable terms." WEBSTER, NEW INTERATIONAL
DicTiONARY (2d ed. 1942) 545.
8. 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902).
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diction. 9 This decision was followed in Nann v. Rainist,10 in which the Court ob-
served that "Equity does not intervene to restrain the publication of words on a
mere showing of their falsity." 1
It has been suggested that the gist of an action in unfair competition is the
unfairness of the acts charged, rather than the element of competition. 12 However,
it would appear that an action which does not involve the element of competition
cannot be based upon the principles governing the wrong called unfair competition.
Where the only unfairness alleged and sought to be restrained is disparagement of
property, the action is in reality little more than one to restrain a libel, which, as we
have seen, is not recognized in New York.' 3 In the instant case the court appears
to have recognized the absence of any profit from the sale of songs motivating the
conduct of the defendant, a cigarette manufacturer, from which competition with a
music publisher could be spelled out. 14 The element of business competition was
present in Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith.15 There the parties were business rivals in the
production of insect spray. An injunction against disparagement of the competitor's
product was granted plaintiff, proof having been presented that defendant was dis-
paraging plaintiff's goods and had instructed his employees to undermine the defend-
ant's business by making false statements concerning his product.' 6 While granting
this injunction, however, the court denied a further request to restrain defendant's
unfair business practices, declaring that the wrong was too remote from the plaintiff,
even though the fraud was practiced on plaintiff's customers, and that it is not
within the province of equity courts to regulate trade practices at the instance of
9. As in Brandreth v. Lance, supra note 3, the Court recognized that the injunction
might have a deleterious effect upon the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
press: "But the precedent which the plaintiff seeks to establish would open the door for
a judge sitting in equity to establish a censorship not only over the past and present con-
duct of a publisher of a magazine or newspaper, but would authorize such judge by
decree to lay down a chart for future guidance in so far as a plaintiff's property rights
might seem to r'quire. . . ." Id. at 392, 64 N. E. 163, 165.
10. 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931).
11. Id. at 317, 174 N. E. at 694.
12. ". . . there is no fetish in the word 'competition'. The invocation of equity rests
more vitally upon the unfairness." Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509, 512
(C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Golenpaul v. Rosett, 174 Misc. 114, 115, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 889,
891 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
13. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 2,4 (N. Y. 1839); Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields,
171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902) ; Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931).
14. "The sole interest of defendants is to create customers for tobacco. They sell no
songs or music publications. There is no business competition here. . . ." The court below
evidently did not consider an intention to profit essential to competition, since that Court
found it sufficient that the parties were competing with each other "in creating the belief
that certhiin songs are popular." Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., - Misc.
-, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 692, 694 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
15. 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N. Y. Supp. 692 (4th Dep't 1928).
16. See also, Old Investors & Traders Corp. v. Jenkins, 133 Misc. 213, 232 N. Y. Supp.
245 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd, 225 App Div. 860, 233 N. Y. Supp. 845 (1st Dep't 1929),
which has been called "the only case . . . where the enjoining of a trade libel was not
fastened on some well-established book of equitable relief." Black & Yates v. Mahogany




An action at law for damages arising from disparagement of property requires an
allegation of special damage in addition to a pleading of the requisites of falsity of
statement and malice.' 8 A corporation engaged in business can maintain an action
for libel, (i.e., defamation of the corporation itself) without proof of special damage
only "where the language used concerning it is defamatory in itself and necessarily
and directly occasions pecuniary injury."' 9 It has been generally held that trade libels
(disparagement of the product) are not actionable unless special damage is alleged
and proved.20 Moreover, the requirements of special damage are not usually satisfied
by allegations of proof of a general decline or loss of trade. Rather, plaintiff must
plead and have a specific loss of trade as evidenced by the loss of specific customers
or sales.21 Having failed to plead such a specific loss to his business as a result
of defendant's representations, plaintiff's second and third causes of action in the
instant case are insufficient for that reason alone in stating a claim for damages re-
sulting from trade libel.
In addition plaintiff's second cause of action alleging that the acts of defendants
were fraudulent in nature and constituted a deception of the public was held in-
sufficient as stating an action in fraud in the absence of further allegations requisite
to such an action. The complaint was bare of any averment that plaintiff was
deceived by -defendants' statement or that it relied upon such representation to
its detriment. The fact that the public may have been deceived and led to rely upon
defenda nts' choice of tunes, thereby adversely affecting plaintiff's business, does not
of itself support an action in fraud by the plaintiff. In New York & R. Cement Co. v.
Coplay Cement Co.22 an injunction was denied plaintiff who, with other manufac-
turers, produced a variety of cement which was known as Rosendale cement by
reason of the location of the quarries. The relief sought would have restrained
a competitor in another locality from manufacturing, labelling and selling his product
as Rosendale cement. The court drew an analogy to the common law rule that a
party cannot maintain a private action for a public nuisance, even though he is
17. Id. at 192, 229 N. Y. Supp. 692, 698-699. Regulation of unfair business parties
would more properly be within the purview of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT.
717, 15 U. S. C. A. § 45.
18. See NEWELL, SrANDER AND LIBEL (4th ed. 1924)_197.
19. Union Associated Press v. Heath, 49 App. Div. 247, 253 (Ist Dep't 1900). The
alleged libel charged plaintiff as a business corporation engaged in collecting news with'
tapping telegraph wires used by a rival corporation. See also, Reporters Ass'n v. Sun
Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 186 N. Y. 437,'441, 79 N. E. 710, 711 (1906): ". . . such an
averment is not necessary when *the language is of so defamatory a nature as to directly
affect credit and to occasion pecuniary injury."
20. Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537 (N. Y. 1830); Le Massena v. Storm, 62 App. Div.
150, 70 N. Y. Supp. 882 (1st Dep't 1901) ; Bosi v. New York Herald Co., 33 Misc. 622,
68 N. Y. Supp. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1901), aff'd, 58 App. Div. 619, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1134 (1st
Dep't 1901).
21. King v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 84 App. Diy. 310, 82 N. Y. Supp. 787
(1st Dep't 1903), aff'd 179 N. Y. 600, 72 N. E. 1144 (1904) ; Reporters Ass'n of America
v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 186 N. Y. 437, 79 N. E. 710 (1906); Tower v. Crosby,
214 App. Div. 392, 212 N. Y. Supp. 219 (4th Dep't 1925) ; but cf. Note (1945) 33 GEORGE-
TOWN L. J. 213, 219.
22. 44 Fed. 277 (C. C. E. D. Pa., 1890). See also, American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw
Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900).
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injured by it, unless his injury is of a'special nature and different from that sus-
tained by the public generally.
In its third cause of action, plaintiff charged that by reason of the fact that the
defendants held themselves out as qualified to make an accurate survey of the nine
or ten most popular songs each week, they were under a duty to make a valid
survey and select only such tunes as were reported by such survey to be the most
popular. By incorrectly rating the ten most popular songs of the week it was
alleged that defendants had breached this obligation which they had undertaken
and were therefore liable for gross negligence. A negligent statement is actionable
only at the instance of one who was reasonably expected to and actually did rely
upon such statement to his damage.23 Thus, in Glanzer v. Szepard24 defendants
were public weighers who, on the direction of a third party, undertook to weigh
plaintiff's goods. The estimate given being incorrect, and plaintiff having relied
thereon to his detriment, defendants were found liable in an action for negligence. 25
Since plaintiff in the principal case had failed to allege a relationship out of which
would arise a duty to act with care or which would lead plaintiff to rely thereon
to his detriment, the cause of action was clearly insufficient.
The first cause of action presents the interesting feature of the case. The decision
dismissing that cause of action should not be regarded as a failure on the part of
the courts to recognize that a wrong can be actionable even though, by reason of a
novel set of circumstances, it cannot be exactly identified with a more inclusive
class of wrongs. The legal remedy, where special damage is alleged, is available. Not
even insolvency of the defendant, the ground upon which Dean Pound suggests equity
should intervene, 26 it is alleged in the complaint. The decision is in line with
established precedent in this state, and while precedent alone should not, in a world
of changing economics, remain the sole arbiter of the law, where the precedent
is supported by sound reason it should be followed. Reason appears to support the
holding. The enjoining of a bare disparagement of property would seemingly call for
an unwarranted extension of the equity jurisdiction of New York courts.
23. In International Products Co. v. Erie R. R. Co., 244 N. Y 331, 337, 155 N. E. 662,
664 (1927), the court recognized that liability can arise only where there is a duty,.if
one speaks at all, to give the correct information, and only then if the declarant has
knowledge that he to whom it is stated intends to rely on it and will be injured by it
if it is false or erroneous. See Buck Terminal Co. v. Insurance Co., 228 N. Y. 575, 127
N. E. 909 (1920).
24. 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
25. Of the Glanzer case, Judge Cardozo has stated: "The bond was so close as to ap-
proach that of privity, if not completely one with it." l-Itramares Corp. v. Touche, 255
N. Y. 170, 182, 174 N. E. 441, 446 (1931) in which it was held that no action in negli-
gence could properly lie against public accountants who prepared an incorrect balance
sheet on the basis of which a third party lent money where there was no privity between
the accountants and the lender. See also Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai
Banking Corp., 245 N. Y. 377, 157 N. E. 272 (1927).
26. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and'Injuries to Personality (1916)
29 HAxv. L. REv. 640, 668.
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INCOME TAXATION-ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME OR PROPERTY-DISREGAPD OF THE
CoRwoRArE ENTrry.-Taxpayer, a construction engineer residing in Texas, entered
into a construction contract with the State of-Texas to erect a building. After
the contract had been partly executed, it was assigned to a corporation created and
controlled by the taxpayer through his ownership of two of the three voting shares.
Taxpayer's wife owned the remaining voting share. All of the non-voting stock,
except one qualifying share issued to the taxpayer's brother, was issued to the tax-
payer's children. The court approved the apparent finding of the Tax Court that
the corporation was regularly formed and that it was operated in the normal man-
ner with observance of all corporate formalities; also that the contract was not one
for purely personal services and was therefore assignable. In the six-month period
prior to the assignment, the taxpayer, with an expenditure of $575,000 received profits
of $86,000 on the contract, which he reported in his individual income tax return.
The balance of the profits for the two months remaining on the contract amounted
to $80,000 after expenditure of only $76,000 and was reported by the corporation
in its tax return. Held, one judge dissenting, the income was correctly reported
since for tax purposes the assignment was effective and the corporate entity would
not be ignored. Cininissioner of Intertal Revenue v. Montgomery, 144 F. (2d) 313
(C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
The case presents two interesting questions of income tax law: (1) Should the
assignment by the taxpayer to the corporation be recognized and (2) should the
separate entity of the corporation be disregarded, in determining income tax lia-
bility?
The proposition concerning the assignment of income is primary. The language
of the applicable section of the statute' is too general to be helpful. However, the
most fundamental of the basic principles governing an income tax is that the person
who earns income must pay the tax thereon. Therefore, it was held in Lucas v. Earl2
that income from earnings such as salaries, wages, or other compensation for per-
sonal services could not be assigned so as to avoid the imposition of the tax on
the assignor. That case was not decided on the fiction of constructive receipt 3
widely used in income taxation, but on an interpretation of the reasonable inten-
tion of Congress as negativing any "arrangement by which the fruits are attributed
to a different tree from that on which they grew."4 All compensation for personal
1. Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code states what income is taxable but
fails to state to whom such income is to be taxed.
2. 281 U. S." 111 (1930) ; 43 HARv. L. REv. 1282.
3. The principle of constructive receipt is not stated in the Internal Revenue Code
but appears as Section 29.42-2 of Regulations 111 and has been developed by Bureau of
Internal Revenue Rulings, Tax Court, and other court decisions. The application of the
principle has the effect of taxing income not actually received by a taxpayer (even
though he reports on the cash basis) if the income is subject to taxpayer's demand and
if income of the taxpayer is paid directly to another. Hence, income may be taxed to
one who never actually receives it if his income is paid to another. And income may be
taxed prior to year of actual receipt of it if it is credited to the account of or set apart for
the taxpayer and it may be drawn upon by the taxpayer at any time. Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1929).
4. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 115 (1930). "But this case is not to be decided by
attenuated subtleties. It turns on the import and reasonable construction of the taxing
act. There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and
provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts
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services whether earned before or after the date of the purported assignment
clearly would, therefore, be taxable to the assignor.5 Another basis for taxing income
is that where income is derived from the ownership of property such income is
taxable to the owner of such property.6 Of course, a man can completely and
irrevocably assign 7 the income-producing property so as to divest himself of all
ownership of both property and its income.8 But, income [the fruit] accumulated
before the assignment of the income-producing property [the tree] should be taxed
to the assignor and the income accruing after assignment of the income-producing
property should be taxed to the assignee.9 Ownership of income-producing prop-
erty generally includes control of, and benefit from, its income, but actual control
of, or benefit from, the income produced by property may exist without technical
legal ownership of the income-producing property. A finding of ownership of income-
producing property may be based for tax purposes primarily on actual control of the
income,' o since ". . . taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements
of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed . ..and .. . income
that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his
own option may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it
or not." 1 Taxation of income to the one who enjoys or receives its benefit appar-
ently rests upon a principle more vague. 12
These principles are not always easy of application.* Future income in the form
of commissions from the renewal of insurance policies has .been taxed to the assignor
on the theory that his services produced the commissions.la The failure of attempts
to spread income by means of the partnership device may be traced to the princi-
ples that the person who earns income is to be taxed on it and that the substantial
owner of income-producing property is to bear the tax. The specific section 14 of
however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a
second in the man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute before
us . . " Id. at 114.
5. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
6. Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person
(1933) 33 CoL. L. Rxv. 791; MAGiLL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 248-268; MAcILL, TIE
IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES (1943) 49-57f
7. Before any attempt to assign income will be effective, the agreement involved must
be a good assignment, the validity of which would be determined by local law. Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5, 12 (1937).
8. Liability for the gift tax under Sections 1000-1006 of the Internal Revenue Code
might arise.
9. Lucas v. Earl, supra, note 2.
10. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940); (1945) 45 CoL. L. Rxv. 111.
11. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378 (1930).
12. See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 677 (1933) where Justice Cardozo referring to
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1929) and United States v. Boston
& Maine R. R., 279 U. S. 732 (1929) stated: "In these and other cases there has been a
progressive endeavor by the Congress and the courts to bring about' a correspondence
between the legal concept of ownership and the economic realities of enjoyment or frui-
tion." And at page 678 he says, "Liability may rest upon the enjoyment by the taxpayer
of privileges and benefits so substantial and important as to make it reasonable and just
to deal with him as if he were the owner, and to tax him on that basis."
13. Helvering v. Eubank, 311, U. S. 122 (1940).
14. Section 182 of the Internal Revenue Code taxes partners as individuals on their
distributive shares of income from the partnership.
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the Internal Revenue Code dealing with taxation of partners is a vehicle for the
application of these principles.'5 However, the lawyer who forwards a case to an-
other lawyer on a fee-sharing arrangement should be taxed on only the forward-
ing fee since each lawyer may be fairly considered to have earned by legal services
his respective portion of the total fee.' 6 A life beneficiary of a testamentary trust
was not permitted to avoid income tax by assigning to her children specified amounts
from the income of the trust for the year following the assignment. 17 However,
the life beneficiary in another testamentary trust effectively avoided income tax
on an annual fixed amount of income from the trust, the Supreme Court holding
that the beneficiary had assigned to the donee a life interest in a portion of the
corpus of the trust.' 8 And yet, a settlor who reserved the power to revoke a trust,
created for his wife with remainder to his children, did not avoid the tax on the
income of the trust,19 nor did the settlor of a short term trust created for the bene-
fit of his wife with right of reversion, where the settlor also exercised substantial
control of the corpus and economically benefited by the income.20 The last four
trust cases illustrate the general principle that income is taxed to the one who in
tax law is the substantial owner of the income-producing property by virtue of his
control of, or benefit from, the income.
In the instant case the majority of the Circuit Court found that the taxpayer
bad made a final and absolute assignment of the contract including legal control
and substantial economic benefit of the income therefrom-in short the "tree" and
its "fruits."'2 1 However, the contract itself was not so much the source of the income
as were the services performed thereunder. Who earned the income was the
decisive question on the assignment aspect of the case. The Tax Court 22 made a
finding which the majority of the Circuit Court approved that the contract was not
one for personal services and that the taxpayer's personal services did not earn
the income reported by the corporation. Assuming the soundness of such finding of
fact-and the Circuit Court is bound by a finding of fact having "'warrant in the
record' and a reasonable basis in the law"23-the decision of the majority is in
accord with the general principles outlined above. It is true that the lack
of proportion between the income reported by the corporation and the period of
performance or amount of expenditure giving rise to the income give support to
the dissenting judge's finding that actually the taxpayer earned most of the income.
However plausible and realistic such a conclusion might be, it does nevertheless
violate the principle precluding judicial review of the Tax Court's findings of fact.24
15. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1932); 32 COL. L. REv. '1080; 41 YALE
L. J. 925. Two partners tried assigning a portion of partnership profits to a mother,
Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 540 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), and to a wife, Harris
v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), but were required to include
such assigned portions in their own returns as unsuccessful assignors.
16. Mark D. Eagleton v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 551 (1937), ag'd on other points,
97 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
17. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941).
18. Blair v. Commissioner, supra, note 5.
19. Corliss v. Bowers, supra, note 11.
20. Helvering v. Clifford, supra, note 10.
21. Lucas v. Earl, supra, note 4.
22. Montgomery v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 1000 (1943).
23. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 501 (1943), rehearing denied, 321 U. S.
231 (1944) ; 57 HARv. L. REv. 753.
24. Id. at 502.
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The other important question in this case dealt with the disregard of the cor-
porate entity. The general rule that a corporation and its stockholders are distinct
applies in income tax law. 25 In fact it was in an income tax case that Justice Holmes
made his oft-quoted statement that "it leads nowhere to call a corporation a fiction.
If it is a fiction it is a fiction created by law with intent that it shjuld be acted on
as if true." 26 However, the rule for all legal fictions is that the fiction will be fol-
lowed only when its purpose will be served; but, where a fiction is not used for
the purpose for which designed, the fiction will be disregarded.27 In corporation law
a corporation formed to circumvent a statute may be disregarded 28 while a corpora-
tion formed to comply with a statute will be recognized.2 9 The fine distinctions
between compliance and circumvention are often difficult to discern.30 The test
of justice and honesty suggested in corporation law3 ' is almost meaningless because
of its vague generality. In the recent tax case of Moline Properties Inc. v. Com-
missioier32 directly involving the issue of disregard of the corporate entity, the
Supreme Court said: "In general, in matters relating to the revenue, the corpor-
ate form may be disregarded where it is a sham or unreal. In such situations
the form is a bald and mischievous fiction."' ' In that case the Supreme Court
based its decision on the theory that the separate entity of a" corporation will
be recognized for tax purposes where the purpose of its creation was equivalent
to a business activity or was followed by the carrying on of business by the
corporation. In corporation law it is generally held that where a stockholder
treats his corporation as his mere alter ego by inordinately interfering in its
activities, the courts will do likewise. For a finding of inordinate interference
it is necessary to have facts such as intermingling of assets, failure to keep books,
substantial noncompliance with corporate formalities and other circumstances indi-
cating abnormal and unusual control.3 4
In the instant case the facts of regular formation of the corporation and operation
in the usual and normal manner with observance of all corporate formalities would
appear to preclude disregard of the corporate entity under the so-called alter ego
doctrine. The disregard of the entity is apparently urged in the dissenting opinion
as a mere makeweight to lend credence to the dissent's principal contention that the
taxpayer had in fact attempted to assign income already earned by him. Here again
the dissenting opinion ignores the conclusiveness which should be accorded to the
Tax Court's apparent finding that the corporation carried on an independent
25. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435, 442 (1934); Case, Disregard of
Corporate Entity in Federal Taxation-The Modern Approach (1944) 30 VA. L. Rzv. 398.
26. Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19, ?4 (1930).
27. BROom's LEGAL MAxIMs (10th ed. 1939) 81-82.
28. State ex rel Johnson & Higgins Co. v. Safford, 117 Ohio St. 576, 159 N. E. 829
(1927); WORMSER, DISREGARD Or TnE CORPORATE FICTION ND ALIED CORPORATION PROB-
LEmS (1927) 63-67.
29. Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924).
30. See Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N. Y. 319, 172 N. E. 521 (1930).
31. Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N. Y. 84, 95, 155 N. E. 58 (1926); In re
Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 405, 52 N. E. (2d) 909 (1943).
32. 319 U. S. 436 (1943).
33. Id. at 439.
34. Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company (1938)
51 HARv. L. REv. 1373.
[Vol. 14
